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AB STRACT
Nuchof the debate surrounding the enactment of President Reagan's tax
plan was concerned with the short rim effects of macroeconomic stimulation.
Now that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has become law, it is appropriate
to look again at the long run effect of these tax cuts. This paper measures,
for 37 different assets and for 18 different industries, the reduction in
effective corporate tax rates that result from the acceleration of depreciation
allowances and the expansion of the investment tax credit. It also uses a
detailed dynamic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy to simulate
the effects of the new Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) on revenues,
investment, long run growth, and capital allocation among industries. 1e find
significantwelfare gains from ACRS, but we find larger welfare gains from
alternative plans that were not adopted.
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Much of the debate surrounding the enactment of President Reagan's tax
plan was concerned with the short runeffectsof macroeconomic stimulation.
With existing combinations of high inflation and high unemployment, most of
us were concerned with using tax cuts to encourage business investment and
employment without causing unacceptable budget deficits. Now that the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has become law, it is appropriate to
look again at the long run effect of these tax cuts. This paper estimates
the likely effects of the new Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) on
revenues, investment, long run growth, and capital allocation among industries.
We will investigate whether attempts to stimulate total investment have had
adverse effects on the use of that investment. We find significant welfare
gains from ACRS, but we find larger welfare gains from alternative plans that
were not adopted.
The general approach of this paper is really a combination of two
approaches. The first uses a Hall—Jorgenson (1967) cost—of—capitalformula
to look at the incentive effects of alternative tax rules. The second
approach uses a general equilibrium model in the tradition of Rarberger(1962)
to calculate tax incidence and welfare effects of discriminatory taxes on
capital. Both of these approaches have advanced over the years, however,
and we will combine more recent formulations of these two models in this
paper. In doing so, we will abstract entirelyfrom short run issues of
macroeconomic stabilization. In particular, we assume a constant and
correctly anticipated inflation rate. We also assume full employmentof
productive factors. There is no involuntary unemploymentin our model,
but there is a labor—leisure choice on the part of individuals.This
"voluntary unemployment" depends on expected after—tax earnings.Similarly,—2—
there is no underutilization of industrial capital, but there is a savings—
consumption decision on the part of individuals. The growth of the capital
stock thus depends on the expected after—tax return to capital.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (also referred to here as the
Reagan tax plan) changes two key provisions for capital cost recovery,
depreciation allowances and the investment tax credit. Under the new
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), any depreciable asset falls into
one of four classes and is given a tax life of 3, 5, 10, or 15 years. Autos,
light—duty trucks, and R & D equipment will be depreciated over 3 years,
and most other equipment will be depreciated over 5 years. A 10—year
life for depreciation purposes will be granted to relatively short—lived
public utility property, and a 15—year life will be granted to other public
utility property and most structures. These recovery periods replace the
previous system of basing tax lives on expected useful lives. For most
assets, the new tax lives are considerably shorter than their economic lives.
Although these shorter lives are effective innnediately, the depreciation
schedule is less accelerated during a five year phase—in period. After 1985,
equipment can again be depreciated by double declining balance with a switch
to sun—of—the—years—digits. All structures immediately receive a 175 percent
declining balance rate, replacing both the 150 percent rate for nonresidential
property and the 200 percent rate for new residential property. Structures
can still switch to straight line.
The Reagan plan has also increased the investment tax credit. Equip-
ment with a recovery period of three years is now eligible for a six percent
credit, and all longer—lived equipment receives a ten percent credit.
These depreciation and investment tax credit provisions have implications
for the effective tax rate on a marginal investment in each type of—3—
equipment or structure. In tiis paper we will calculate and compare effective
tax rates under the old law and under the new law, along the lines suggested
in papers by Jorgenson and Sullivan (1982) and by Hulten and Wykoff (1981).
These papers were written before the law was enacted, however, and they
evaluated cost recovery proposals that were somewhat different from the
15—10—5—3 plan with tax credit changes that was actually adopted. Our method
also differs from theirs by comparing tax rates under the assumption of tax-
minimizing depreciation choices by firms. We take this approach because we
are unable to consistently compare actual depreciation practices under the old
law and under the new law: actual practices are not yet available for the new
law. Finally, since we want long—run effects of these changes, we evaluate only
the post—1985 depreciation rules for new investments.
Both the Hulten—Wykoff (H) study and the Jorgenson—Sullivan (JS) study
conclude that the adoption of a 10—5—3 approach drastically reduces effective
tax rates. Because depreciation is accelerated rather than indexed, a
reduction of inflation would send effective tax rates negative. They differ,
however, in their conclusions about interindustry distortions. JS find that
the new capital recovery system would widen the gaps among tax ratesin
different industries, implying less efficient allocation of capital than
under the previous law.11W find that that the 10—5—3 proposal would make
interindustry tax distortions lower among non—residential sectors.
The major difference between our study and the other two is that we go
on to measure the size of efficiency changes associatedwith the new
depreciation law. We capture not only iritersectoralmisallocations
associated with tax rate differences, but also the intertemporalmisalloca-
tion of resources associated with the overall level of capitaltaxation.—4—
Efficiency effects are nasured with the use of a computational general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy and tax system. This model is capable
of second—best evaluation with simultaneous distortions due to corporate
taxes, personal taxes, and property taxes. It encompasses tax advantages on
owner—occupied housing, observed differences in the extent to which firms of
each industry are incorporated, and observed differences in the financial,
policies of the firms in each industry. These existing distortions are
important for measuring the interindustry effects of the Reagan capital
cost recovery plan, because nonneutralities of the new tax code may reinforce
or offset existing nonneutralities.
Finally, our study includes evaluation of other investment incentive
plans that were not adopted. The Auerbach—Jorgenson (1980) first year
capital recovery plan gives finns a depreciation deduction at the outset
equal to the expected present value of economic depreciation. This proposal
effectively indexes depreciation allowances to inflation, as discussed by
Jorgensonand Sullivan (1982) and by Nulten and Wykoff (1981). We also look
at the effects of indexing capital gains taxes.
Following this introduction, Section II derives theformulas for effec-
tive marginal tax rates. The Reagan plan is described in moredetail, as is
necessary to demonstrate the calculationof present values for depreciation
allowances in each asset category. Our 37 assets include twenty typesof
equipment, fourteen types of structures,residential housing, land, and
inventories. Section III proceeds to do those calculations, presentingtax
lives, investment tax credit rates, and overall effectivemarginal tax rates
for each tax scheme we consider.
Section IV presents the major features of the Fullerton—ShovenWhalley
(FSW) general equilibrium model used to simulate the above tax changes.—6—
the asset to (l—k)q. Second, the firm receives a reduction In taxes due
to depreciation allowances. The present value of this deduction per
dollar of investment will be denoted by z, so the total tax reduction is
uzq. The particular value for z will reflect the tax lifetime for the
asset, the depreciation formula, and the basis (historical or replacement
cost) on which the depreciation allowances are taken. It will also
reflect the discount rate.
With the inclusion of all these features of the tax code, the equilibrium
condition is expressed as:
(l—k)q =
J(1_u)ce)T edt + uzq. (1)
The gross of depreciation rental rate, c/q, is then a function of the tax
parameters as well as i, ó, and r
1(1—u) —r+
cIq (l—k—uz). (2) 1—u
We will denote by p the real rate of return net of depreciation:
Pc/q— 6. (3)
The concept of the effective corporate tax rate refers to a measure of
the difference between p, the real rate of return net of depreciation, and s,
the opportunity cost to the corporation. To measure s, we note that the
corporation arbitrages between real capitaland bonds yielding 1(1—u) —
Itis therefore a borrower or lender at the real after—tax interest rate.
We thus take s =1(1—u)—iTas the corporation's net of tax return to saving.—5—
Since this model specifies 18 private industry categories, we convert the
vectors of 37 asset tax rates to vectors of 18 industry tax rates by using
unpublished data from Dale Jorgenson on the stock of each asset used in
each industry. However, these marginal tax rates by industry are not
directly applicable to the FSW model which requires tax rates based on the
ratio of taxes paid to capital income. Section V describes our procedure
to convert the marginal tax rates into rates appropriate for thatmodel.
Theresulting simulations of each tax plan are described in Section VI,
andSection VII is a brief conclusion.
II. Effective Tax Rates on Capital
To calculate effective tax rates for different assets, we start with
the cost of capital formula developed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967).The
underlying premise behind this formula is that the profit maximizingfiriL
will undertake a marginal investment project if it earns a return netof
taxsuch that the present value of cash flows is at least equal tothe initial
outlay.Under competitive equilibrium conditions the two will be exactly
equal. Denote the acquisition cost of the asset by q.Assume that the
rental rate is initially equaltoc, but that it grows at the rate of
inflation, ¶.Furtherassume that the quantity of capital embodied inthe
investment declines at the economic depreciation rate6. If the statutory
marginal corporate income tax rate is u, the netof tax rental receipts
from the investment at time twillequal (1 —u)ce
—
Toderive
the present value of such a stream, thesenominal cash flows would be
discounted at the nominal after—tax interest rate, i(l —u).
Capital cost recovery provisionsaffect the rental rate in two ways.
First, an investment tax credit at ratek lowers the acquisition cost of—7—
It is common to express the difference between p and s as a proportion
of p, the gross of tax return. Under this approach, the "gross" corporate
tax rate is
=(p—s)/p. (4)
Forinvestments outside the corporate sector, the statutory income
tax rate for the corporation, u, is replaced by the marginal income tax
rate for the proprietor, m. It is then straightforward to rederive
equations (1) through (4), identical except for the use of in in place of u.
We turn next to the measurement of z, the present value of depreciation
allowances on a dollar of investment. The easiest case to consider is that
of the Auerbach—Jorgenson proposal, where firms receive a first year deduction
equal to the expected present value of economic depreciation, using replace-
ment cost as a basis. Given a constant economic depreciation rate 6 for








The Auerbach—Jorgenson proposal treats all assets symmetrically. It
thus provides a high first year deduction for equipment with a high 6,
alow deduction for structures with a low 6, and no deduction for land
andinventories which do not depreciate. In contrast, both the old tax
law and the Reagan plan have separate depreciation rules for equipment
andfor structures.—8—
For equipment, both the old and the new tax laws allow double
declining balance (DDB), with a switch to sum_ofthe—years'digitS(SYD).
This combination is used here as tax—minimizing practice because it can be
shown to provide the earliest possible depreciationdeductions.2' Define
L as the asset's lifetime for tax purposes,an integer numberof years.
Define C as the time of the optimal switch, and B as the decliningbalance
rate (equal to 2.0 for equipment). We can then defineb E B/L as the
exponential rate for the first part of the asset's life.Since DDB starts
out with higher depreciation allowances, and sinceSYD on the remaining
basis must eventually exceed DDB, the optimal switching point canbe





where the S function is defined by
5(x) = (x-j) (7)
j=0
if x is an integer. As seen below for cases where x is not an integer,
the summation goes from zero to the integer part of x.
Normally the firm would use DDB in the first year, would be indifferent
in the second year, and would switch to SYD by the third year of the asset's
life. However, both the old and new tax laws makeuseof the half year
convention, assuming that all assets were bought on July 1. The firm thus
uses DDB for C =1¼years, and SYD afterwards. Take, for example a one—
dollar asset with L=5, B2, andb.40.Then the firm would deduct .2
(half of b) in the year of purchase and .32 (b times .8) in the first full—9—
taxable year. Switching to SYD for the .48 remaining basis over 3.5 years,
the firm would use numerators of 3.5, 2.5, 1.5, and .5 respectively. The
su of those figures for the denominator is 8.0, as defined by S(L—C) in
equation (7) where L—G is not an integer. These depreciation charges are
discounted at the nominal after tax rate of return because allowances are on
a historical cost basis. The general expression for the present val o
depreciation deductions under the old law is:





The integration is not performed here to save space.
The new tax law is based on the same principles, but it incorporates
two interesting differences. First, depreciation of the last half year is
moved up. As a result, the 3 year class is depreciated in only 2 years.
the five year class in 4½ years, and the 10 year class in 9½ years.
For the five year asset example, depreciation deductions are .2 in the first
half year and .32 in the first full year, but the remaining .48 basis is
given SYD treatment over only 3 remaining years. Second, the taxpayer is not
given the choice of when to switch. If the firm selects a 5 year life for
equipment, the law actually provides a table requiring deductions of .2,
.32, .24, .16, and .08, starting in the year of purchase. The general
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J=2
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Finally,for structures, both laws specify a declining balance rate
with a switch to straight line. The swiçch time G is again found where the
two methods provide the same deductions. Since continued exponential
deductions would allow B/L of remaining basis, and since straightline would
allow 1/(L—G) of the same remaining basis, we can set these two expressions
equal to each other and solve for G as:
G=(Bl)L.
(10)
With B =1.5for structures under the old law,firms would switch after 1/3
of the asset's life. With B =1.75under the new law, C is 3/7 of L. In
either case, the firm must beginstraight line at the start of a tax year.
For a 15—year structure under the newlaw, for example, C would be6.42 years.
If we assume mid—year purchase dates on average,
the firm actually switches
after 6.5 years. The general expression
for z under both laws is then:
J41½
C—1½ i(l—u)idi (11)
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III.The Marginal Tax Rates Under Each Tax Regime
This section presents marginal tax rates for 37 assets under the
provisions of the old tax code, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
and the Auerbach—Jorgenson first year capital recovery plan. These tax
rates, for each version of the law, are then combined with information
on the use of each asset by each of the 18 private industries to derive
marginal effective corporate tax rates for each industry.
Equations (1) to (4) express the tax rate as a function of u, 1, n,
6, k, and z. We viii discuss u, i, and n first because those parameters
do not vary by asset. The corporate tax rate u is taken as .46, the top
statutory rate on corporations. The great bulk of corporate investment
is undertaken by firms in this bracket.
To obtain the nominal interest rate i, we start with the assumption
that the after tax rate of return would be .04 in the absence of inflation.
The before tax interest rate with no inflation, i, would be .041(1—u).The
interest rate with inflation then depends on how 'iaffectsi. Empirical
evidence in Feldstein and Summers (1978) and in Summers (1981) supports a
"strict" version of Fisher's Law,whereinflation adds point for point to
nominal interest:
i =i+ 71. (12)
0
Inthis formulation the real after tax interest rate s, which equals i(i—u)—.
would fall with n. Alternatively, evidence in Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1980)
• supports a "modified" version of Fisher's Law,whereinflation adds more
thanpoint for point to nominal interest, enough to maintain the .04 real after
4/ tax return:—— 12—
(13)
Weuse both (12) and (13) to obtain alternative values of i.
For the expected inflation rate n, we use .07 in the standard case.
This value reflects the gross private domestic product deflator between
1970 and 1980. For sensitivity, we also discuss some results with
inflation rates of four and ten percent.
Other parameters vary across the 37 asset categories listed in column
1 of Table i.--" Economic depreciation ratesare taken from Hulten and
Wykoff (1982), as shown in column 2 of Table 1. These rates rangefrom a
low of .015 for housing to a high of .333 for automobiles. Inventories
and land are assumed not todepreciate.-"
The rate of investment tax credit k varies not only by asset but also
according to the tax law being simulated. For the old law,in column 3 of
Table 1, we use the statutory rates of .10 for public utility structures
and equipment with at least a 7 year tax life, .067 for equipmentwith at least
a 5 year life, and .033 for equipment with atleast a 3 year life. Though
other studies have shown lower effective ITC rates due toinsufficient tax
libability and incomplete carryover provision, our useof statutory rates
is consistent with the assumptions of our steady stateequilibrium xrodel.
In such a model, no firm would have abnormal profits, butall would have
normal profits and tax liability.
Finally, the present value of depreciation allowancesalso varies by
asset and tax law. Equations (8) to (11) express z as afunction of the
tax lifetime L and the declining balance rate B, aswell as the nominal

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































providethe midpoints of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system.We
take these lifetimes from Jorgenson—Sullivan (1982)and ignore the ossibi1ity
of shorter lives substantiated by facts and circumstances.Most structures
are assigned these lives directly,but the ADR system allows 20 percent
longer or shorter lives for equipmentand public utility structures. Because
of our optimizing tax practice assumption, these assetsare assigned lives
that are 80 percent of ADR midpoints, except wherethe use of a longer life
would reduce effective taxes through eligibilityfor a higher investment ta>:
credit. The resulting vector of lives, shownin column 4 of Table 1, is
consistent with the ITC vector inthat 3 and 5 year assets get a thirdand
two—thirds of the full investment tax credit,respectively.
Equipment (assets 1—20) and public utilitystructures (assets 27—31) use
double declining balance (B2.0) and sum_of_the_years_digits in equation
(8) to obtain z under the old law.Other structures use B =1.5with a
switch to straight line in equation (11). Housing(asset 35) uses B =2.0,
switching to straight line, also in equation(11). When all of the resulting
z values are combined withModified Fisher's Law(MFL) and the parameters
described above, we obtain the effectivecorporate tax rates t shownin
column 5 of Table 1.
This column demonstrates considerablevariance of effective tax rates
by asset. Aircraft, for example,had a 7 year life, accelerated depreciation,
and full investment credit, resulting
in an effective tax rate of lessthan
two percent. Structures, withoutthose tax reducing features, wereoften
taxed at rates greater than 46 percentdue to historical cost depreciation
with inflation. Inventories andland are effectively taxed at exactlythe
statutory rate because theyreceive economic depreciation (at ratezero) and
no investmentcredit.!i— 15—
Notshown in Table 1 are the tax rates resulting from alternative i
and ,combinations.With Strict Fisher's Law (SFL), the tax rates appear
to have even more variance. In all cases, however, both p and s are reduced.
As a result, the tax or subsidy as a proportion of p can appear large even
when the wedge (p—s) is small. As shown in Bradford—Fullerton (1982), t8
caneven have the wrong sign when an asset is so subsidized that the before
tax return is negative in the denominator. Such anomalies occur for several
assets under SFL, but we use only industry tax rates in the model.
These are defined by (p—s)/, where p is the asset—weighted average of p
for each industry. Sinceis always positive, and since s is positive,
t5 by industry are always well defined.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the eighteen industries of our model, while
column 2 shows their effective corporate tax rates under MFL. Land
intensive industries such as real estate and agriculture are weighted
towards the .46 effective tax rate on that asset. The low rate on trans-
portation, communications and utilities reflects the tax credits for public
utility structures as well as the low rate for the aircraft example mentioned
above. Next, effective tax rates of column 3 portray the same tax regime,
but under the assumption of Strict Fisher's Law. Because of lower gross of
tax returns p, these tax rates are both higher and more variant than under
NFL.
Turning now to effective tax rates under the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS), we begin with the statutory credits shown in column 6 of
Table 1. Five—year equipment and public utility structures all get ten
percent credits while three—year assets receive a six percent credit.
Because of our equilibrium model with no carryover problems, both sets of



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































availabilityof the credit through the new law's extended carryover and
leasing provisions.
Column 7 displays lifetimes of each asset under the new law, assuming
again that each asset is homogeneous. The law assigns a three year life to
autos, light trucks, R &D equipment, certain racehorses,and personal
property with an ADR midpoint of four years or less. Our level of aggrega-
tion shows autos with a three year life, but none of the other assets has
an (average) ADRmidpointof four years or less. Thus, all other equipment
gets a five year life. Similarly, for public utility structures, we assigned
a ten year life to any asset category with an ADRmidpointbetween 18 and
25 years, as provided in the law. All other structures have a 15 year life,
except mining, shafts, and wells which we reduced from 6.8 to a5 year life.
The lives for equipment and public utility structures are combined with
B =2.0in equation (9) to calculate z and effective tax rates. The lives
for other structures are combined with B =1.75in equation (ll).-" Result—
ing are shown for Modified Fisher's Law in column 8 of Table 1.Effective
tax rates are clearly and consistently negative for all typesof equipment
and positive for all types of structures. There is no a priori reason to
believe that inter—asset distortions would be reduced by this tax change.
Notice also how sensitive tax rates are to lifetimes and credits.As
the lifetime for computers (asset 11) changes from 8 to 5 years, theeffective
tax rate changes from plus 16 to minus 63 percent. Asthe credit for
autos (asset 15) changes from .033 to .06, its effective tax ratechanges
from plus 20 to minus 33.5 percent.
The corresponding industry tax rates are shown in column 4 ofTable 2.
The fact that all these rates exceed zero reflects comparatively high
weights on structures, inventories and land in allindustries. Because— 18—
taxrates are all lower than underthe old law, intertetnpOral distortions
might be reduced. But because theystill exhibit considerable variance,
there is no a priori reason tobelieve that intersectoral distortionswill
be reduced. Column 5 provides new
effective tax rates under SFL, rates
that are again lower than those ofthe old tax regime. Because the taxrates
start out higher under Sn, however, wemight expect Reagan's tax plan to
produce greater intertemporal gains
under SFL than under NFL.
For both MFLandSFL, we have translated the asset taxrates into
industry tax rates through a fixedcoefficient capital stock matrix. %e
therefore measure the costs of interindustrydistortions, assuming a zero
substitution elasticity among assets. As analternative, Gravelle (1982)
measures the costs of inter—assetdistortions, assuming a unitary substitution
elasticity among assets.
Finally, the Auerbach—JOrgeflsofl (AJ) plan
provides t5 that are all 46
percent when the ITC is zeroand when Nulten—Wykoff depreciation rates are
used to determine the first year recoveryin equation(5)•/ This neutrality
with respect to interest rates andinflation is in fact the plan's innovation.
The uniform rate implies intersectOralwelfare gains but higher overall
taxes on capital. In combinationwith E. Cary Brown (1982) investment tax
12/
credits, however, the uniform rate canbe made as low as desired. The
general equilibrium model of thenext section can be used to estimatethe
size of net efficiency changes.
IV. The General Equilibrium Model
The model has considerable disaggregatiOnof
industries and consumers, with a comprehensive
treatment of the United States
tax system. This section firstdescribes the main features of themodel and— 19—
thenprovides detail on the treatment of capital taxation)
1. An Overview of the Model
The modeled economy is divided into eighteen profit maximizing producers,
two government sectors, fifteen consumption commodities, and twelve consumers
differentiated by income class. Each industry has a Cobb—Douglas or Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function, where the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor is chosen as a "best—guess" from
evidence in the literature. Each output can be used as an intermediate input
through a fixed coefficient input—output matrix. Outputs can be purchased
by government, used for investment, or converted into consumer goods. There
is also a simple foreign trade sector.
Each consumer has initial endowments of labor and capital services which
can be sold for use in production. Because of perfect factor mobility and
competition, the net—of—tax return to each factor is equal among industries.
A consumer can also choose to buy some of his ownlaborendowment for leisure.
The capital stock is fixed in any one period, but the dynamic version of the
modelallowsthe savings response to augment the stock in later periods. De—
inand functions are based on CES utility functions with double nesting. The
elasticity of substitution between present and future consumption is based
on an estimate of the uncompensated saving elasticity with respect to the net—
of—tax rate of return. For this value we use 0.4 as found by Boskiri (1978).
The elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is based on an
aggregate estimate of 0.15 for the unconipensated labor supply elasticitywith
respect to the net—of—tax wage.
The entire spectrum of Federal, state, and local taxes are typically
modeled as ad valoreni tax rates on purchases of appropriate products or
factors. Corporate income taxes and property taxes are modeled as different— 20—
effectiverates of tax on use of capital by industry. Social security,
workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance appear as taxes on each
industry's use of labor. Personal income taxes operate as different linear
schedules for each consumer group, with marginal tax rates increasing from
an average of 1 percent for the lowest income group to an average marginal
tax rate of 40 percent for the highest income group.
The model is parameterized for 1973 using data from the National Income
and Product Accounts, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expendiure
Survey, and the Treasury Department's merged tax file. These data are adjusted
for known inaccuracies of government collection procedures and for general
equilibrium consistency requirements. This "benchmark" data set is used to
solve backwards for relevant preference parameters and tax rates, so that
model solution can replicate the benchmark equilibrium. Tax rates cn be
altered to calculate a simulated equilibrium with different resource allocations
for comparison with the benchmark. The model is solved using a variant of
Scarf's (1973) algorithm for an equilibrium price vector where excess deipans
and profits are zero.
The model does not include involuntary unemployment, endogenous inflation,
or other aspects of disequilibria. It measures real effects without a money
equation, expressing all prices in relative terms. Voluntary unemployment
is captured through the labor/leisure choice, however, and the effectsof in-
flation are modeled by adjusting effective tax rates appropriately.
Finally, the model requires that government run a balanced budget. Thre—
fore, when policy changes generate alterations in the tax equationsand para-
meters, the implied revenue gain or loss cannotbe recorded as a government
surplus or deficit. It would be possible to balance the budget by changing
expenditures, but any change in government spending on transfer progrtns or— 21—
publicgoods would affect each consumer group's welfare in a manner that cannot
be adequately captured in this model. Since we are not trying to evaluate
Reagan's planned expenditure reductions, we will abstract from expenditure
changes. Consequently, any loss of government purchasing power must be
compensated in the model by an offsetting tax increase.
In previous uses of this model, we have offset revenue losses by scaling
up personal income tax rates. In the context of Reagan's tax plan, however,
this option does not seem appropriate. Instead, we will generally maintain
an equal yield through additional taxes on consumer expenditure. This replace-
ment can be considered an additional state or local sales tax, or a Federal con-
sumption—type value added tax. Either may yet be used to replace lost revenues.
As an alternative, we also consider a lump—sum tax (or rebate) in proportion
to the twelve consumers' original after—tax incomes. Though not a viable
policy option, this replacement serves to isolate theefficiencyproperties of
eachsimulated change in effective corporate tax rates.
2. Taxationof Capital
As stated above, the modeled industries face different tax rates on
their use of capital. Specifically, the total capital tax paid by each
industry is the sum of its liabilities under the corporate income tax (CIT),
the property tax (PT), the corporate franchise tax (CFT). and the persona].
income tax on income from capital of that industry. This personal tax
component, which we call the "personal factor tax" (PFT), includes personal
taxes paid on dividends, retained earnings, and all income from noncorporate
business in the industry. Its value takes into account not only the marginal
personal income tax rate averaged over owners of capital, but also such
features as the partial exclusion of dividends and the value of capital
gains tax deferrals. The calculation of the personal factor tax is also— 22—
dependenton the expected inflation rate, in order to measure taxation of
nominal rather than real capital gains. To obtain t, the "cash flow"
tax rate for each industry, capital tax payments are divided by total net
capital income of the industry (EN):
cf—CIT+ PT + CFT + PFT
t (14)
Each of these variables have industry subscripts which are suppressed for
notational simplicity.
The Fullerton—Shoven—Whalley model obtains these tax rates for the bench-
mark calculations by using observed corporate income taxes and other taxes
paid in 1973 in the numerator of this expression. These average taxrates are
appropriate for simulating income effects and government tax receipts.In
a steady state equilibrium model, they are also appropriateestimates of
marginaltax rates since the two sets of rates will be equal. Alternative
tax regimes are simulated with appropriate adjustments to (14). Integration,
for example, is modeled by removing CIT and adjusting the personalfactor
tax to account fully for corporate source income.With the integration examnie,
cash flow tax rates are still equal to tax rates for incentive purposes.
With changes in depreciation or investment tax credits, however, only new
investments will be subject to the new marginal rates.Previous investments
will continue to pay taxes based on old lives and schedules, affectingtax
receipts as long as they generate capital income.Cash flow tax rates,
will gradually approach incentive tax rates,t,asa higher proportion of
capital is covered by the new law. TheFullerton—ShoVeflWhalleY modelnow
includes this capability. Each industry's factordemand functions depend on
factor prices gross of incentive tax rates, as thesewill affect all capital— 23—
allocationdecisions at the margin. On the other hand, cash flow tax rates
are used to determine tax receipts and the after—tax incomes of capital
owners. In the benchmark sequence of equilibria, cf and t for each
industry are equal, but in a tai c;ar.ge simulation the two sets of rates
can be specified separately.
The ne:\t section describes our conversion of ACRS into model—equivalent
form, that is, the derivation of t and With a switch to shorter lives,
cash flow rates will exceed incentive rates for a time, resulting in revenues
that exceed the new steady state revenues as a proportion of income. This lump—
sum tax effect will capture the efficiency properties of accelerated deprecia-
tion and investment tax credits. In particular, expensing of ne investments
is more efficient than corporate tax elimination, because more revenue can be
obtainedwith the same marginalrates.
V.The Model—Equivalent FormofEach Tax Regime
The standard version of the FS1del, as just described, uses observec
corporatetaxes in the numerator of (14) to obtain cashflow and incentive
taxratesfor the benchmark calculations. On a steady state growth path
with correctly anticipated inflation, no risk,no measurement problems, and
no transitory profits or losses, the two sets of rates would be equivalent.
However, when we compared different formulations of the marginal tax rates
byindustry under the old law with different formulations of the average
tax rates by industry from Commerce Department data between 1973 and 1978,
we never obtained a correlation coefficient higher than 0.3. This lack of
resemblance between average and marginal tax rates poses an interesting
research question, but one which lies outside the scope of this paper. For
now we can appeal to the existence of unanticipated inflation, risk, measure-
ment problems, and transitory profits or1osses.--'— 24—
Ifwe accepted the FSW assumption that average tax rates are suitable
for use as marginal tax rates in the benchmark, then the new rates appropriate
for ACRS would not be immediately obvious. Instead, we assume that marginal
tax rates from Table 2 are suitable as average tax rates in the benchmark.
This procedure satisfies the steady state requirement that average and marginal
tax rates be equal in the benchmark, and it provides appropriate new margin1
rates for ACRS from Table 2.It has the further advantage of updating the 1973
general equilibrium model to 1980 tax law for comparison with the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
We thus changed the nde1 by rejecting CIT data in favor of
CIT* =t8(BTP*+ INT) —u(INT), (15)
where INT are the corporate interest payments of each industry and BTP* are
the before—tax profits that would have to be earned under marginal tax rates
to yield the observed after—tax profits ATP. Taking the latter asfixed data
for the counterfactual, BTP* equals ATP plus CIT*, so algebraically
CIT* = ATP— INT. (16)
l—tgc c
Only u does not vary by industry. These expressions accountfor the
fact that debt financed investments qualify for the same investment tax
credits and depreciation deductions as equity financed investments.The
gross of tax return on both forms of finance (BTP*+ INT) corresponds to p
and is taxable at t. Interest payments are deducted by corporationsat the
statutory rate u, but are then included by individuals later at theindividual
rate m-'— 25—
Asimilar treatment of noccorporate business closes the model.
Marginaltax rates are calculated for each asset and industry using a
statutory personal rate m, equal to .278, the average personal marginal
tax rate on capital income in the model. All rental income in eachindustry,
noncorporate interest payments, and noncorporate profits are assumed to be taxable
at these calculated effective rates, while noncorporate interestpayments are
bothdeducted by business and included by individuals at rate m.
Oncethe benchmark sequence has been calculated, we are ready to
specify cf and t' for simulations. First, from the new law in Table 2
are used in equation (16) to get CIT*. Second, noncorporate effective rates
under the new law are used to adjust personal factor taxes. Then.eqt1aticv (1LL)
provides tforall future periods.
The cash flow rates, however, will begin at exactly the old cash f1o
rates,since all capital income will initially be generated by assets put in
placebefore the tax change. These older assets will depreciate at an average
rate ,whilethe totalcapital stock will increase at approximately the
steady state growth rate n. The ratio of old capital to total capital after
N years will be
N
R= l+n (17)
The cash flow tax rate for each period is calculated from (16) and (14) as
before, but where t is based on a weighted average of p from the old law
and p from the new law. The weights after N years are R and (1 —R)respec-
tively. The FSW model can then still simulate its fifty years by calculating
six equilibria that are ten years apart. Suitable terminal conditions account
for years beyond fifty.— 26—
Theseprocedures furnish de1—equivalent tax rates that account for
industrydifferencesin the use of many assets, state and local taxes on
capital, the degree of incorporation, and the financial decisions of firms.
On the other hand, these behaviors are not allowed to change with the tax
law. Each industry continues to use the same mix of assets, the same
proporLii: of corporate activity, and t1e same proportions of capital income
accruing to debt and equity. With no risk in the model, these procedures
imply a fixed debt/equity ratio for each industry. We thus concentrate on
capital intensity decisions in this paper)-'
VI. Simulation Results
The FSW model provides complete descriptions of each equilibrium in the
base and revised sequences. In Table 3, we select key results for discussion
in this paper. Column 1 contains a list of simulated tax regimes, categorized
by alternative assumptions. In Part I of this table,effective corporate tax
rates are calculated using Modified Fisher's Law of equation (13). The
corresponding industry tax rates for the old law and for ACRS are shown in
columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 above. When the new lower tax rates are imposed, we
abstract from expenditure changes or budget deficits by raising some other tax
to replace the lost revenue. The revised equilibrium includes either (A.) a
lump—sum tax on each group in proportion to their orginal after tax incoine,
or (B.) a consumption—type value added tax (VAT), equivalent to a sales tax.
In either case, the additional tax is at a rate just high enough so that
government can make the same real purchases as in the corresponding period
of the benchmark sequence.
The present value of welfare gains, in billions of 1980 dollars, is shown
in column 2 of Table 3. These are the sums of consumers' compensating variations,
and can be expressed as a percentage of $97 trillion, ithe present value of— 27—
Table3
Welfare Gains, Revenue Changes, and Capital Growth
for Each Tax Regime
2. 3. 4.
Eventual Eventual
Present Value Simulation Required Replace-
of Welfare GainsCapital as a ment Tax as
1. in Billions ofProportion of a Proportion
Tax Regime 1980 Dollars ease Capital of Revenue
I. )kdified Fisher's Law
A.Lump-Sum Replacement
Reagan Plan (ACRS) 311.9 1.029 .0125
B. VAT Replacement
1. Reagan Plan (ACRS) 264.1 1.031 .0185
2. Auerbach—Jorgenson(AJ) —221.6 0.976 —.0105
3. AJ with Credit (.75AJ) 286.3 1.031 .0206
4.(.75AJ)withIndexing 642.4 1.078 .0530
5.Integrationwith Indexing 916.3 1.114 .0704
II. Strict Fisher's La
A. Lump—SumReplacement
Reagan Plan (ACRS) 1019.2 1.088 .0316
B. VAT Replacement
1. Reagan Plan (ACRS) 894.2 1.091 .0460
2. Auerbach—Jorgenson (AJ) 458.0 1.015 .0061
3. AJ with Credit (.75AJ) 1066.0 1.075 .0371
4. (.75AJ) with Indexing 1485.7 1.126 .0698
5. Integration with Indexing 1759.9 1.173 .0904— 28—
consumers'incomes in the benchmark sequence.2-" That is, the $311.9
billion gain for ACRS with lump—sum tax replacement represents 0.32 percent
of base income.
A substantial portion of the recent ACRS debate concerned growth effects
and revenue effects of alternative policies. Tax cuts can provide incentives
for additional investment, increasing total capital, and the future tax base.
As an indicator of the eventual effects on capital,we show in column 3 the
ratio of the capital stock after fifty years in the simulation to the capital
stock after fifty years in the baseline. In the same ACRS example, the
capital stock is 2.9 percent higher than in the baseline. Then, in column 4.
we indicate whether this feedback effect was sufficient to offset the reduction
in tax rates. This column shows, after fifty years, the proportion of revenue
that must come from the replacement tax,as necessary for government to make
the same real purchases. Since ACRS reduces revenue by 1.25 percent, feed-
back effects were not sufficient to increase revenues.
Since lump—sum taxes are not generally available, the VAT provides a
more realistic replacement tax. It does not distort intertemporal decisions in
this model,butdoes affect the labor/leisure choice. Welfare gains of ACRS
are then smaller, at $264.1 billion, as shown in column 2 of Table 3. Note
that cash flow rates exceed incentive rates for a time, providing some non—
distorting revenues on previous investments.
Next, we simulate three versions of the Auerbach—Jorgenson first year
recovery plan. The basic plan provides a uniform .46 effective corporate
tax rate, higher than all industries' former tax rates under the assumption
of MFLasshown in Table 2. The increased intersectoral efficiency is Over'-
powered by reduced intertemporal efficiency, for a net loss of $221.6 billion.
The simulated capital stock after fifty years is lover than in the baseline, but
revenues are higher.
-— 29—
Thenext simulation combines the AJ first year recovery with an E.Cary
Brown investment tax credit such that the uniform is .345, three—fourths
of the statutory .46 rate resulting from AJ alone. Thisparticular combination
(.75AJ) implies incentive tax rates for the FSTI model that are at thesame
overall level as those for ACRS. It will thus imply the sameintertemporal
distortions and allow us to isolate intersectoral effects. Since the$286.3
billion welfare gains exceed the $264.1 billion of ACRS under thesame assump-
tions, the difference can be attributed to intersectoral misallocations11
associated with the differing under ACRS.-"
First year recovery schemes effectively index depreciation since inflation
cannot affect the present value of deductions. The FSW model also al1o's
indexing of capital gains by appropriate changes in the personal factor tax
of equation (14). This construct includes taxationof all inflationary
increasesin the value of capital in each industry, but at reduced personal
rates to account for deferral and the 60 percent exclusion. "Indexing" in
Table 3 refers to eliminating any tax on purely nominal capital gains. In
combination with (.75 AJ), indexing provides substantially larger welfare
gains, at $642.4 billion.
Finally, for the baseline with Modified Fisher's Law, we resimulate the
integration plus indexing plan which formed the major topic of earlier papers.1
The CIT* is eliminated from the numerator of (14), but dividends and retained
earnings become fully taxable at the personal level. Noncorporate capital
income taxation is unchanged,but nominal capital gains cease to be taxed. In
combination, these policies imply reduced intertemporal and intersectoral
distortions. This plan does not have the advantage of lump—sum revenues on
previous investments, since separate taxation of all corporate capital is
eliminated. Integration reduces capital tax revenue, encourages savings,— 30—
increasesthe capital stock by eleven percent, and provides a $916.3 billion
welfare gain, equal to 0.94 percent of baseline iticorne.
In the second part of Table 3, tarecalculated using Strict Fisher's
Law of equation (12). The old law and ACRS tax rates for this case were
shown in columns 3 and 5 of Table 2. Since the old were often greater
than .46, all of these capital tax Cuts imply greater intertemporal gains
than under NFL. ACRS provides a full one percent of baseline income as a
gain in consumer welfare. This time, however, the uniform AJ rate of .46
represents an effective tax reduction. It provides iritersectoral gains
together with some intertemporal gains.
Welfare gains in column 2 suggest substantial sensitivity to the assump-
tions about nominal and real interest rates that are embodied in NFL and SFL.
However, the ordering of the tax regimes is robust. The intertemporal gains
from the lower tax rates of ACRS still dominate the intersectoral gains frort
the uniform tax rates of Auerbach—Jorgenson. Both are still dominated by thç
combined intertemporal and intersectoral gains of AJ with credit, the uniform
.345 effective corporate tax rate. Indexing capital gains still provides
further welfare gains, while integration still provides the largest gain of
all plans considered. A major force in these results is that any overall
capital tax reduction increases welfare, because of the efficiency properties
of a consumption tax in this ndel. The VAT replacement is superior on
efficiency grounds, but has its own distributional implications that are not
considered here.
Other simulations were performed to test the sensitivity of our results.
A lower inflation rate implies lower effective corporate tax rates for
every industry in the benchmark. As a result, welfare gains from ACRS are
lower than those in Table 3. A higher inflation rate implies higher initial— 31—
and greater welfare gains fromACRS.When inflation erodes the real value
C
ofdepreciation deductions, acceleration makes more of a difference. Indexing,
however, is still more efficient than acceleration. Results are also
aensitive to other parameters in the model. In particular, the capital stock
responses and welfare gains in Table 3 depend on the 0.4 savings elasticity
assumedearlierin the description of the model. The revenue impact also
depends on this assumed elasticity. The present value of these welfare gains
depends on the assumed elasticities of substitution between capital and labor
in production. Fullerton, Henderson, and Shoven (1952) discuss more fully the
sensitivity of results to these and other model specifications.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has provided a courehensive study of the cost recovery pro-
visions in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. We have measured, for 37
assets and 18 industries, the reduction in the cost of capital and effective
tax rates resulting from acceleration of depreciation allowances and expansion
of the investment tax credit. We then used these revised measures of capital
cost incentives to simulate the long run effects on investment and growth.
Our principal finding is that,although the Accelerated CostRecovery
System (ACRS) moves the economy toward
increased output in the long runby
reducing tax biases against capital, economicefficiency might be further
enhanced by other reforms thatwere not selected. ACRS lowers tax rates
on capital, but it leaves large differencesin tax rates among corporations
in different industries. With thesediscrepancies, capital will tend to he
allocated less efficientlyamong its alternative uses. It would bepossible,
as an alternative, to enact a reform thatreduces overall effective tax
rates by the same amount as underACRS, hut that tends to equalize taxrates
across industries. Adoption of— 32—
theAuerbach—Jorgenson first year recovery plan in combination with an
investment tax credit would move in this direction by indexing allowances
at economic rates of depreciation.
More importantly, however, both the ACRS and the first year recovery plan
fall short of alleviating further distortions in U.S. tax policy toward capital.
First, nominal capital gains are subject to tax, so inflation raises the
effective tax rate on income from real capital gains. Second, businesses
in the corporate sector are taxed differently from those in the noncorporate
sector. Integration of the personal and corporate income tax systems could be
used to eliminate this differential. Results in this paper indicate that the
efficiency gains associated with integration in combination with indexation of
capital gains would be far larger than the gains from ACRS or from the first
year recovery plan. However, such a reform would create a larger revenue
shortfall. We did not investigate distributional implications of any tax
plan, nor did we investigate efficiency or distributional implicationsof any
government expenditure reduction.- Fl—
Footnotes
1/ Certain structures are treated as equipment for depreciation purposes,
including public utility property andsinglepurpose agricultural
structures. Under the old law, residential structures receive double
declining balance, but under the new law they are grouped with other
structures at 175 percent of declining balance with a switch to straight
line.
2/ See Shoven and Bulow (1975). If a firm expects a steady stream of
positive taxable profits, it would always take depreciation allowances
as early as possible. Under other circumstances, however, the firm
maypreferlater deductions. Under the old law, the firm could delay
its depreciation deductions by delaying the switch or by using straight
line. The new law is less flexible, however, because it mandates the
switchover time that would be optimal for the firm wanting the earliest
deductions. Both laws allow the flexibility to combine just straight
line depreciation with longer tax lives, but this decision can be made
onlyat the time of acquisition. Our analysis abstracts from these
details by using an equilibrium model where all firms expect positive
taxable profits (but no abnormal profits).
3/ Many studies simplify the first two terms in equations (8) to (11)
by using b as an exponential rate over C years:
Gbe_bt e_
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This expression inaccurately assus a continuously declining basis, and
itinaccuratelyleaves ebG as the remaining basis. Instead, equations
(8) to (Ii) follow the law by specifying yearly adjustments to basis.
Furthermore, many studies simplify the third term of these z expressions
by using discrete time:





Instead, equations •(8) to (11) discount depreciation deductions at
the end of a year by more than those at the beginning of the year. This
procedure explicitly recognizes that depreciation deductions are "coincident
with the associated earnings and tax liability of equation (1).— F2—
4/Fisher's original argument ignored taxes to find that equation (12)
would maintain real interest rates in the presence of inflation. With
taxes, the same logic would suggest that (13) would maintain the real
after tax return. However, taxes are not neutral to inflation, due to
historical cost depreciation and the taxation of purely nominal capital
gains. Bradford and Fullerton (1982) demonstrate the sensitivity of
tax rates to the choice between (12) and (13), or more generally, to the
choice of i and T.
5/The corporation also earns Income on intangible assets such as knowledge
acquired through research, or goodwill acquired through advertising.
Because we do not have adequate estimates for the stock of these assets
in each industry, they are excluded from this study.
6/For assets 27 through 31, the depreciation rates come from Jorgenson and
Sullivan (1982). They use the }iulten—Wykoff methodology to obtain esti-
mates for these additional assets. The rate for housing is an unpublished
estimate of Hulten andWykoff.
7/Lifetimes for many of the 37 assets are actually averaged over more diverse
asset categories. As a result, only some of the assets in one of our
categories may need their lifetimes adjusted to receive higher credits.
Since the aggregation to 37 assets provides considerable detail, however,
it seems appropriate to treat each asset as individually homogeneous. One
example of where this treatment maybeless appropriate is in mining,
shafts and wells. The 6.8 year life here reflects an average of intangible
drillingwith a zero life and other structures with a longer life.
8/Inventories could be effectively taxed at more than 46 percent with FIFO
accounting in times of inflation. Because of our optimizing assumption,
however, all firms would use LIFO to minimize taxes.
9/For weights, we use Dale Jorgenson's unpublished data on the 1977 stock
of each asset used in each industry. See Jorgenson and Sullivan (1982)
and Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980) for more detail. Briefly, they use
Commerce Department investment series, a capital flow table, and an RAS
scalingroutine to estimate an investment matrix for every year. Then
they use Hulten—Wykoff depreciation rates and the perpetual inventory method
to obtain the capital stock matrix for 1977.
10/ As mentioned above, the new law provides tables with depreciation amounts
rather than specifying DDB with a switch to SYD. The derivations of (9)
and (11) make clear the equivalence, however. Thus we are effectively
putting the tables of the law directly into present value calculations.
11/ If actual depreciation rates differ from the Hulten—Wykoff rates used in
the first year recovery provisions, then actual effective tax rates could
differ from 46 percent. Thus the uniformity of AJ effective tax rates
depends on the accuracy of depreciation rate estimates.
12/ Brown (1982) suggests an investment credit that is proportional to the
difference between the acquisition cost of the asset and its first year
allowance. This particular choice of asset—dependent credits and first
year write—of fs results in a uniform effective tax rate.- F3-
13/More detailed descriptions of this modelmay be found in Fullerton,
King, Shoven, and Whalley (1980, 1981). These papers used themodel
to simulate integration of the personal andcorporate income tax systems.
14/ By considering the expected future tax on a hypothetical dollarof invest-
vent, the marginal tax rate depends on expected inflation. If inflation
turns out to be higher than expected, the use of historicalcost deprecia-
tion will increase tax payments and thusaverage tax rates. Indeed,
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1982) argue that inflation rates have beenhigher
than expected, acting as a lump—sum tax on investmentsalready in place.
Also, if some of the return to capital is treated as a risk premium,
and if losses on marginal investments can be used to offsetprofits on
other investments, then the corporate tax can be viewedas risk—sharing
by the government. As such, at least part of the tax receipts would not
reflect any marginal investment disincentives. Fullerton and Gordon(1982)
have argued that marginal tax rates are considerably less thanaverage or
cash—flow tax rates for this reason as well. Finally, if capital income
contains abnormal profits or is measured with error, then cash flow taxes
could again exceed the expected future taxes on a competitivemarginal investment.Indeed, actual tax practices are not the tax minimizing
practices assumed in this paper, firms can affect tax receipts by taking
charitable deductions, and the marginal tax rate calculations can err
by excluding intangible assets, depletion deductions, and other detailed
features of tax code.
15/ In a few cases, where (16) implied negative corporate taxpayments, we
set CIT* to zero. An asset can have anegative effective tax rate as in
Table 1, but only when we assume that the firm has a taxable return on other
assets. It would be difficult for a firm, or especially an entire industry,
to have negative taxes in the long run setting of our model. Note, however,
that the leasing provisions of the 1981 Tax Act may make negative taxes
more likely.
1.6/ As mentioned above, Gravelle (1982) considers changes in the mix of
assets. Sleinrod (1982) includes debt/equity decisions, explained by
clientele effects. Fullerton and Gordon (1982) include debt/equity
decisions, explained by bankruptcy costs at the margin. They also include
considerations of risk, with a powerful effect on marginal tax rates and
welfare costs. Finally, Fullerton—Gordon suggest that local property taxes
are not disincentives at the margin to the degree that mobility ensures
compensating local public benefits. We abstract from these phenomena
here.
17/ The discount rate is .04, the consumers' after tax rate of return in the
model. Because the FSW model uses 1973 data, we multiply aU values by
1.95, the ratio of 1980 to 1973 national income.
18/ Intersectoral uiisallocations of ACRS are probably understated because —
weassume that producers in each industry cannot substitute among
assets. Table 1 taxratesby asset vary much more than Table 2 tax
rates by industry, because the latter are all averages of the former
with different setsofweights given by columns of thecapitalmatrix.— F4—
19/Even when t are all the same, corporate taxes as a proportion of
profits can differ due to different financial policies. Equation (15)
captures ttie fact that debt financed investments are taxed at t while
interest is deductible at rate u. Equation (14) captures the subsequent
tax on interest income of individuals in the "personal factor tax". It
also captures the differing property taxes and corporate franchise taxes
by industry.
20/ See Fullerton, King, Shoven and Whalley (1980, 1981). These papers used
observed CIT in (14) for both average and marginal tax rates. When
corrected for the difference between 1973 and 1980 prices, those integra-
tion results with VAT replacement fall directly between the MEL and SFL
results reported here.-Ri
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